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According to Section 78(2) of the Correctional 
Services Amendment Act 25 of 2008 (CSAA), 
the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
may deny parole to an offender serving life 
imprisonment. This role was performed by 
the Minister of the Department of Correctional 
Services even before the department was 
merged with the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development.1 In 2015, Ferdi 
Barnard applied to the court for a review of 
the minister’s decision denying him parole. The 
court declined to review the decision because 
it found it to be reasonable. The applicant 
only discovered the reasons that informed the 
minister’s decision in the course of hearing 
his review application. The minister’s failure to 
Granting parole to offenders serving life sentences has raised questions in public and political 
discourse. This contribution evaluates the discretion of the minister to decline parole under Section 
78(2) of the Correctional Services Amendment Act 25 of 2008 (CSAA). It examines the drafting 
history of Section 78(2) of the CSAA, evaluates the full extent of the ministerial powers, and reviews 
its recent application in Barnard v Minister of Justice, Constitutional Development & Correctional 
Services and Another. It argues that ministerial discretion to refuse parole needs to be re-examined 
in the wake of that decision, and recommends elements for inclusion in the minister’s decision to 
refuse parole. 
give the applicant information regarding the 
outcome of his parole, and the reasons for his 
decision before Barnard applied for review, 
are problematic. This contribution analyses 
the minister’s refusal in light of the drafting 
history of the section and its application in 
Barnard v Minister of Justice, Constitutional 
Development and Correctional Services and 
Another (Barnard).2 It is argued that an offender 
should know the decision and the reasons that 
informed it, at the time the decision is passed. 
The terms applicant, offender and prisoner are 
used interchangeably to refer to the offender 
under Section 78 of the CSAA. 
Bounds of the minister’s discretion 
to deny parole
After the National Council (NC) has considered 
the record of proceedings and recommendations 
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of the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board 
(CSPB), it may recommend to the minister that 
an offender is placed on parole.3 If the minister 
refuses to grant parole, he recommends the 
treatment, care, development and support that 
the offender should undergo to improve his 
chances of placement on parole.4 The NC may 
advise the minister to reconsider granting parole 
to an offender within a period of two years from 
the date of the earlier decision.5
Consideration for parole under Section 78 of 
the CSAA requires that three steps be followed. 
Firstly, the CSPB considers the merits and 
the conditions that the offender should follow 
before he or she is granted parole, and that it 
makes recommendations to the NC for further 
scrutiny.6 The purpose of scrutinising the 
recommendations of the CSPB is to establish 
if the offender, when released on parole, will 
be able to adhere to the conditions for his 
release.7 Secondly, the NC scrutinises the 
recommendations of the CSPB with regard to 
parole of an offender.8 The involvement of the 
NC only occurs in applications for parole under 
the aforesaid action. Thirdly, the minister makes 
a decision to grant or deny parole.9
Section 78(2) of the CSAA gives the minister 
the discretion to decline to place an offender 
on parole, and to make recommendations that 
relate to the treatment, care, development and 
support of the offender. These recommendations 
are aimed at improving the offender’s likelihood 
of being placed on parole. They should be 
sufficiently stated to enable the offender to 
make informed decisions. This section, however, 
does not provide for a review of the minister’s 
decision. The offender has to resort to the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) 
to review the minister’s administrative decision.
Section 6(2) of the PAJA provides for various 
grounds for a judicial review of an administrative 
decision. These include lack of authority and 
unlawful delegation, bias, failure to comply 
with the mandatory procedure, procedural 
fairness, error of law, review of the decision-
making process, rationality and reasonability.10 
The offender may plead any of these grounds 
as evidence in his or her application. The PAJA 
does not provide for any other kind of procedure 
that the offender may follow, other than possible 
reconsideration and recommendation by the NC 
to the minister within a period of two years. If the 
minister does not reconsider his decision, the 
offender may apply for a review of the minister’s 
administrative decision.11
drafting history of Section 78 of the 
Correctional Services Amendment Act
The object of the amendment to the Correctional 
Services Act in 2008 was to bring the act in line 
with the White Paper on Correctional Services 
of 2005.12 The initial bill included Clause 62 
[now Section 78], which sought to leave it to the 
minister to decide which offenders would get 
parole. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
on Correctional Services expressed concern that 
certain parts of the bill gave the minister various 
powers relating to parole.13 The committee 
required the amendment to embrace the broader 
role of parole, namely that of rehabilitating the 
offender.14 Committee members felt that if the 
minister had powers to grant or deny parole, 
the offenders, and persons who were affected 
by the offender’s acts, would commence 
unnecessary litigation.15 The two reasons that 
informed the committee’s concern were that 
firstly, this litigation was perceived to be based 
on the executive nature of the minister’s power, 
and secondly, that the regulatory powers of the 
minister under Section 82 were sufficient.16
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
and PAJA were enacted to give effect to the 
principle of administrative justice in a coherent, 
well-managed, just, uniform and equitable 
system.17 However, scholars such as Julia Sloth-
Nielsen held the view that the current parole 
system fell short of these principles, and argued 
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that the decision to let the minister decide 
parole terms contravened the rule of law.18 The 
South African Human Rights Commission was 
of the opinion that to give the minister the power 
to decide on parole in cases of life imprisonment 
would be problematic, as it was a judicial 
role.19 The committee nevertheless adopted 
the amendment, which gave the minister the 
discretion to decide parole terms under Section 
78 of the CSAA. 
The concerns of the committee prior to 
the adoption of the amendment related to 
whether the proposed acts of the minister 
were administrative or executive actions.20 
In President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others v South African Rugby Football 
Union and Others, an administrative action 
was defined as the action or function to be 
done, other than the functionary or the person 
who carried out the action.21 However, it did 
not reflect the peculiar nature of the executive 
function under Section 78(2) of the CSAA. In 
Abel Zanele Mbonani v Minister of Correctional 
Services and Others (Mbonani), the court stated 
that organs of state should treat people with 
dignity, honesty and fairness.22 This position 
created a fusion of the functionary and the 
function and, therefore, the administrative act 
could not be severed from the minister’s position 
as a member of the executive. In essence, the 
minister’s decision affected the offender’s right 
to freedom and security of a person.  
Application in Barnard 
In Barnard, the applicant sought to review the 
minister’s refusal to place him on parole. At 
the time of his application, he had previous 
convictions on two counts of murder, one count 
of attempted murder and another count of 
theft. He applied for parole in 2013 after he had 
served 16 years and 8 months in prison. At this 
time the NC recommended that he should not 
be placed on parole and that it would reconsider 
his profile after 12 months.23 The parties agreed 
that the NC should submit a recommendation 
to the minister by 19 December 2014 and 
that the minister would make a decision by 
31 January 2015.24 The NC recommended 
parole for Barnard from 1 June 2015, upon 
completion of the pre-release programme.25 He 
had to be monitored electronically, and adhere 
to the normal parole conditions of the DSC.26
The minister declined to place Barnard on 
parole until after 12 months and required 
that the CSRB aid Barnard to perform six 
conditions.27 At this point in the parole process, 
the minister had on two occasions given his 
approval that Barnard’s profile be re-examined 
after 12 months. Barnard based his review 
application on various grounds, including the 
fact that the decision was unreasonable.28 
These grounds provided evidence that there 
had been a violation of Barnard’s right to a 
just and fair administrative decision. There is 
no need to repeat how the court dealt with 
the statutory and policy framework governing 
parole, because it is out of the scope of this 
contribution. The minister stated that despite 
the decision document being headed ‘Reasons 
for decision’, it did not contain the reasons 
for his refusal to grant Barnard parole.29 He 
claimed that the ‘Reasons for decision’ simply 
listed the steps that the department would 
be required to take in assisting Barnard in 
the period between the refusal and the fresh 
consideration of his profile.30 
The minister’s reply indicates that firstly, the 
CSPB did not communicate to Barnard the 
reasons for its recommendations to the NC, 
to be taken further to the minister. Secondly, 
the minister did not communicate the reasons 
for the refusal of parole to the offender.31 The 
drafters of Section 78(2) did not envisage these 
two scenarios. The minister stated that, firstly, 
he considered positive factors such as the 
applicant’s behaviour and adjustment during 
incarceration.32 Secondly, he also considered 
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negative factors such as the applicant’s criminal 
history.33 The minister noted that that the 
applicant was still a danger to the community.34
Only in court was the applicant alerted to the 
factors that the minister had considered before 
making the decision. The decision given to the 
applicant on 25 February 2015 indicated that 
the applicant had not been placed on parole and 
that the minister’s recommendations had to be 
followed by the department before reconsidering 
his parole after 12 months. However, the 
reasons that led to the minister’s decision were 
lacking, which the applicant did not know prior 
to submitting his application for review. 
The court did not fault the minister for not giving 
the applicant all the information regarding his 
parole before the application for review. This was 
firstly an indication that the minister may deny 
an offender parole, and make recommendations 
for a future successful parole application. 
Secondly, the minister’s reasons need not form 
part of the recommendations communicated 
to the offender on the day of the decision. In 
Barnard, the court used the reasonableness 
test in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Others, to evaluate 
the minister’s decision.35 The court looked at 
the nature of the decision, the identity and 
expertise of the decision-maker, and the range 
of factors relevant to the decision.36 Other 
factors include the reasons for the decision, the 
nature of competing interests, and the impact 
of the decision on the lives and wellbeing of 
those affected.37 With regard to the reasons for 
the decision, these were not communicated to 
Barnard before the application for review. The 
court established that the minister’s decision 
was reasonable, but did not deal with his failure 
to communicate the reasons that informed his 
decision before Barnard applied for review. 
Whether the substantive reasons for the denial 
of parole should be communicated, and 
whether these reasons should be given to the 
offender at the same time that the decision is 
communicated to the CSPB, remain unresolved.
A working framework
Parole is an executive function that requires the 
minister to exercise reasonableness in granting 
or declining it. With regard to declining parole, 
a clear framework is key to upholding the roles 
of the executive, legislature and judiciary in 
this administrative process. While Parliament 
may prescribe harsh sentences to show that 
the country is tough on crime, an unforgiving 
attitude, contrary to the ubuntu concept of 
national understanding and forgiveness, should 
be avoided.38 Parole serves the interests of 
offenders, victims and government through 
the encouragement of the use of ubuntu for 
reconciliation.39 While there is no express policy 
on the use of ubuntu for parole, reconciliation 
embraces ubuntu as a tool for punishment.40 A 
working framework that revisits the content and 
context of the minister’s decision under Section 
78(2) of the CSAA is important.41 Ubuntu serves 
as a transformative tool that creates cohesion 
in the demographic, cultural and legal diversity 
of South Africa.42 It provides a transition from 
South Africa’s apartheid era to the democratic 
dispensation. Since respect for human rights is 
a cornerstone of this democratic dispensation, 
ubuntu underpins the restoration of relations 
between offenders and the community, which 
goes against parliamentary policy decisions to 
punish offenders.43 Given that ubuntu balances 
punishment for a crime with restorative 
measures such as parole, the decision to 
deny parole should always take cognisance of 
administrative justice.44
Engaging with the definition of administrative 
law is important in creating this framework. 
Administrative law applies to public authorities 
or a branch of law that regulates the activities 
of bodies that exercise public powers or 
perform public functions, irrespective of whether 
those bodies are public authorities in a strict 
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sense.45 Secondly, administrative law is the 
area of public law that regulates the exercise 
of public power and the performance of public 
functions by natural and juristic persons and 
the organs of state.46 Thirdly, administrative 
law emphasises the effective control of public 
administration and administrative activities to 
ensure that the exercise of public powers does 
not adversely affect the rights of individuals.47 
It is clear that administrative law effectively 
regulates what the administration may or may 
not do, and what remedies are available in the 
case of maladministration.48 The actions of some 
private institutions or bodies may also qualify as 
administrative actions, even though these bodies 
and institutions are not strictly speaking part of 
the broader public administration domain.49 
These reflections do not envisage the exercise 
of a quasi-judicial role in the minister’s refusal 
to grant parole, which affects an offender’s 
right to liberty. This is because the decision is 
made by the minister in an administrative sense 
rather than a judicial one.50 In Derby-Lewis v 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and S v Makwanyane, the courts stated that the 
minister needs to uphold the concept of ubuntu 
and embrace an individual’s inherent human 
dignity.51 According to Van Vuuren v Minister of 
Correctional Services and Others, this course 
of action enables the minister to use parole as a 
tool of restorative justice between the offender 
and his community.52
The content of the decision
The decision should include three aspects: 
the refusal to grant an offender parole, the 
reasons that inform this decision and the 
recommendations that follow. Firstly, it is 
only fair that these three aspects form part 
of the communication in order to enable an 
affected party to make an informed decision 
on the next course of action.53 Secondly, it 
minimises perceptions of unreasonableness 
and administrative bias on the part of the 
minister.54 The importance of these three aspects 
is underscored by the problematic nature of the 
minister’s decision, which hinges on criminal 
justice in as far as it determines the liberty of an 
individual. The non-communication of the reasons 
for the refusal of parole to an offender exhibits a 
lack of transparency. A decision communicated 
with these three aspects enables an offender 
to make an informed decision, and prepare an 
informed application for review. An offender 
who does not apply for review may follow the 
minister’s recommendations based on the 
reasons that informed his refusal. These three 
aspects enhance the accountability of the minister 
to the offender, the victims and the public.55
The offender has a right to be considered for 
placement on parole.56 According to Mujuzi, 
parole is a legitimate expectation of an offender 
to be considered and placed thereon upon the 
fulfillment of all required conditions.57 This is an 
indication that placement on parole is a privilege 
and not a right. However, the Constitutional 
Court implied the existence of the right to be 
placed on parole in Agole Abdi Jimmale and 
Another v S (Jimmale) when it stated that a non-
parole order should be made only in exceptional 
circumstances.58 The court stated that since 
the non-parole order was a determination in the 
present for the future behaviour of the offender, 
there was a possibility of issuing the order based 
on inadequate information about the offender.59 
Although the court did not expressly provide 
for placement on parole as a right, it implied as 
much. Since the court implied the granting of 
parole as a right in Jimmale, the minister’s finding 
should therefore include the decision, the reasons 
that inform it and the recommendations. This 
conduct upholds the equitable maxim that justice 
should not only be done but also manifestly be 
seen to be done.60 
The context of the decision
The context of the decision to decline parole 
refers to that time when the three aspects that 
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form the content of the decision should be 
communicated. It is based on the requirement 
of natural justice that a person should know the 
reasons for a decision passed against him or 
her, to aid the next course of action.61 The three 
aspects of the content of the decision declining 
parole should inform the communication to the 
offender on the date that the decision is passed. 
In Barnard, for instance, the decision denying 
parole, the recommendations and the reasons 
for the refusal should have been communicated 
on the same day, before Barnard applied to the 
court for an administrative review. It may be that 
an affected party will not seek legal redress if the 
three aspects of the decision are communicated 
at once and simultaneously.
Conclusion
These recommendations may be instructive 
to a minister’s decision to allow or deny the 
placing of an offender on parole. A finding under 
Section 78(2) of the CSAA should include the 
decision to refuse parole, the reasons that 
inform this decision, and the recommendations 
that should be followed by the offender. A failure 
to do this should launch a review application on 
grounds of unreasonableness under the PAJA.62 
In his decision to decline parole, the minister 
may make a material departure from the 
reasons and recommendations of the NC. He 
ought to give a full explanation why he departed 
from the reasons and recommendations of 
the NC. The offender is then able to make an 
informed decision when deciding on a course 
of action. This enhances the accountability, 
transparency and consistency of the decisions 
made by the minister.  
The courts should interpret Section 78(2) of 
the CSAA in a manner that promotes dignity, 
equality and freedom.63 The minister’s decision 
should enable the offender to make an informed 
decision before seeking administrative review 
of the finding. It is recommended that further 
research is carried out on how the courts 
should do this in light of the past interpretation 
of Section 78(2). In the interim, the current 
literal interpretation of the section by the 
courts, requiring only that the decision and 
recommendations are communicated to the 
offender, may be solved by the aforementioned 
approach. Although the court dealt with the 
issues of Barnard decisively, it is probable 
that its position would be different if it had 
considered the information Barnard needed to 
have at a particular point in the parole process 
before lodging his application for review.
To comment on this article visit 
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